# No Hard Feelings?
## The Effects of Competition on Vote Transfers in Two-Round Elections

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**Abstract**

Runoff elections are a useful method for solving coordination problems in majoritarian electoral systems based on single-member districts in that they provide a formal mechanism for ideologically similar parties to coordinate on a single candidate. The mechanism is, however, not free of problems as it places ideological neighbors in competition with one another on the first ballot. The temptation to campaign against the members of one's own bloc carries risk as it may reduce the willingness of the supporters of the losing party on the first ballot to cast their vote for the party that will represent its ideological bloc on the second ballot. We revisit and extend Tsebelis's (1988a) work on the conditions under which parties are able to curb their incentives to engage in intra-bloc campaigning and by deriving additional testable hypotheses and expanding the analysis temporally to include elections from 1958 to 2012.

**Keywords:** Runoff elections; coordination; campaigning; competition, cohesion

**Word Count:** 7849 words (excluding appendix)

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## Cohesion & Competitiveness

Parties competing in two-round elections often face difficult choices. On the first ballot of the election, the candidates compete against one another for coveted spots on the second ballot. In doing so, the candidates employ a variety of strategies available to candidates seeking office: adopting and adjusting campaign platforms, manipulating the salience of various issues, and engaging in positive and/or negative advertising. In many ways, each of these strategies is geared towards convincing voters that the candidate is better suited for office than the other candidates — much of the campaigning is aimed at distinguishing one's candidacy, and characteristics, from other candidates. The candidate's need to distinguish herself from the other candidates may, however, come back to haunt them in the second round of the election — whether or not the candidate has advanced onto the second ballot. If the candidate was successful in advancing onto the second ballot, her strategy on the first ballot may have alienated the supporters of unsuccessful candidates who otherwise might have been inclined to vote for the candidate on the second ballot. A candidate that was unsuccessful on the first ballot may similarly come to regret their campaign strategy as it may affect the willingness of their supporters to vote for her preferred candidate on the second ballot.

If electoral campaigns were waged purely on the basis of the candidates' characteristics and qualifications, the presence of a second ballot would not pose much of a problem for the candidates. But most electoral contests — at least those we tend to be interested in — are waged in terms of policy. The fact that elections tend to be about policy in a substantial part, and that voters tend to have a common perception of the policy space, places ideologically similar parties in competition with one another. Thus, in order to gain advantage on the first ballot, a party will have to target its ideological neighbors — whose supporters are more easily swayed to reevaluate their decision of whom to support.

A simple spatial model highlights the incentives facing the parties. Consider the position of the Communists in figure 1. In terms of policy competition, the Communists primarily compete with the Socialists. By adopting a more centrist platform, the Communists can increase their vote share, but their gain is the Socialists' loss. The Conservatives are, however, not affected by the Communists adopting a more moderate platform (as long as the Communists don't leapfrog the Socialists). That still leaves us to consider the possibility that the Commu-

nists could gain by devising a strategy to win votes from the Conservatives by campaigning on valence issues by, for instance, running negative campaign advertisements directed at the conservative candidate. However, a successful campaign against the Conservative candidate would primarily affect the voters that previously were indifferent between the Socialists and the Conservatives or weakly preferred the Conservative candidate to the Socialist one. The Communist strategy would, therefore, primarily benefit the Socialists. The Communist candidate may still benefit indirectly in the sense that it might make a Socialist victory more like, which would be preferred to a Conservative candidate winning. Therefore, the Communist candidate will benefit more directly from targeting the Socialist candidate. In sum, one may expect the intensity of the competition on the first ballot to be the greatest among the candidates that stand to gain the most by standing together on the second ballot.

**FIGURE 1:** THREE PARTY COMPETITION




The observation that members of the same ideological block face such a dilemma is not novel. In France, the Socialist Party and the Communist party have a long history of forming electoral alliances that stipulate that the candidate winning fewer votes on the first ballot of the election should withdraw from the race and endorse the more successful party if both of the candidates advance onto the second ballot.[1] Blais & Indridason (2007) come to a similar conclusion analyzing the pre-electoral alliance between the Socialists and the Greens in the 2002 legislative election. Magyar (2022) finds that pre-electoral alliances are most likely to form among parties that are ideologically similar and when they perceive doing so is electorally advantageous. Golder (2006) suggests that

[1]Currently, the run-off system used in legislative elections in France employs a vote threshold requirement, allowing any candidate that wins more votes than 12.5% of the number of registered voters to advance onto the second ballot. The threshold was 5% when the run-off system was adopted in 1958 but was raised to 10% in 1966 and to 12.5% in 1976.

pre-electoral alliances are not always easy to form as they may require parties to not field candidates in some districts, which is likely to raise the ire of potential candidates and voters alike. Doing so may be more easily achieved when the potential pre-electoral coalitions already hold a large number of seats — in analyzing incumbency advantage, Dano et al. (2022) find that incumbents face fewer ideologically similar candidates, which is consistent with a greater degree of electoral coordination. Focusing on the alliance between the Socialist and the Communist, Rochon & Pierce (1985) note the incentives to act in both a cohesive and a competitive manner and find, using data from interviews with Socialist candidates, that the incentives to act cohesively give way to competitiveness precisely when they are most likely to matter, i.e., when the left bloc has a reasonable chance of carrying the constituency.

In a series of works, Tsebelis (1988a,b, 1990), takes issue with Rochon & Pierce's (1985) conclusion. Tsebelis, in particular, argues that if Rochon & Pierce's (1985) argument is true, it is difficult to understand why the parties would act cohesively when it is unlikely to make a difference and, since they are destined to be unsuccessful, it makes little sense for the parties to renew their cooperative agreement election after election. Using a simple formal model, Tsebelis argues that two factors influence the effectiveness of the second-round agreement between the Socialists and the Communists. First, the closeness of the contest between the left bloc and the right bloc should increase the effectiveness of the agreement, i.e., the parties will have an incentive to moderate their criticism of parties belonging to the same bloc as failing to do so risks tipping the balance in favor of the opposing bloc.

Second, the closer the contest between the Socialists and the Communists, the more intense the competition between the two parties can be expected to be. Where the competition between the parties is intense, the parties are less likely to hold back in their criticism of the other party with the consequence that the voters of the losing party of the alliance are less likely to transfer their votes to the winning party on the second ballot. Using data from the 1978 French legislative election, Tsebelis finds support for both of his hypotheses. Vote transfers occur more efficiently where the left bloc and the right bloc are more evenly matched in terms of their electoral support and where the support of the parties within the left bloc is more asymmetric.

Much has changed in French politics since the 1978 election. In 1978 the Communists and the Socialists were fairly evenly matched in terms of their electoral support — making the 1978 election ideal for studying Tsebelis' hypotheses

about intra-bloc competition. Since then, as shown in figure 1, the Communist's support has declined significantly and by 2007 its support was just over one-fifth of its support in 1978.[2] It is, therefore, interesting to consider whether the insights offered by Tsebelis have held up over time and whether they apply to the right bloc as well. Before doing so, we first revisit Tsebelis' theory to show that his theoretical framework yields some additional hypotheses.

**TABLE 1:** EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST AND THE SOCIALIST VOTE
— VOTE SHARE ON FIRST BALLOT —

| | COMMUNIST | | | SOCIALIST | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YEAR | VOTES | SEATS | % SEATS | VOTES | SEATS | % SEATS |
| 1978 | 20.6% | 86 | 17.6% | 22.6% | 103 | 21.1% |
| 1981 | 16.2% | 44 | 9.0% | 36.0% | 266 | 54.2% |
| 1986 | 9.8% | 35 | 6.7% | 31.0% | 206 | 36.0% |
| 1988 | 11.3% | 27 | 4.7% | 34.8% | 260 | 45.2% |
| 1993 | 9.3% | 24 | 4.2% | 17.6% | 53 | 9.2% |
| 1997 | 9.9% | 35 | 6.1% | 23.5% | 246 | 42.6% |
| 2002 | 4.8% | 21 | 3.6% | 24.1% | 141 | 24.4% |
| 2007 | 4.3% | 15 | 2.6% | 24.7% | 186 | 32.2% |
| 2012 | 6.9%† | 7 | 1.0% | 29.4% | 280 | 48.5% |

† In 2012, the Communists ran as a member of the electoral alliance Left Front

## Competing with Allies

Tsebelis (1988a,b, 1990) presents a simple model in which the two parties choose whether to cooperate or to defect. Cooperation implies that the parties refrain from attacking their ally on the first ballot in order to maximize the transfer of votes to the winner on the second ballot while defecting means that the party decides not to hold back in its criticism of its ally in the hope of being the winner of the bloc on the first ballot. Tsebelis then assumes that the payoff from cooperation equals $\bar{R} + p_v V$ where $\bar{R}$ is the expected utility of making, and sticking to, an agreement at the national level, $V_i$ is the value that the party associates with the bloc's candidate winning the seat in district $i$ and $p_v$ is the probability of the bloc carrying the district. Similarly, the payoff from defection equals $\bar{T} + p_{prox} U_i$ where $\bar{T}$ is the value associated with making the alliance at the national level, $p_{prox}$ is the probability of party $i$ being the winner within the bloc and $U_i$ is the value party $i$ associates with being the party represented

[2]Note that the 1986 election was held using a proportional representation system.

on the first ballot. Based on this formulation of the parties' utilities, Tsebelis argues that the degree of cohesion that results, and therefore the amount of vote transfers that takes place, can be described as:

$$\textit{cohesion} = c + (aV)\textit{victory} - (bU)\textit{proximity} \tag{1}$$

We will now reformulate Tsebelis' model slightly to help clarify the implication of these assumptions. To keep things simple, we focus on the constituency and ignore the possibility that the outcome in the constituency might impact which bloc holds the majority at the national level.

Let $p_w$ denote the probability that the left bloc wins the election. To denote the utility of the bloc carrying the constituency let $W_i$ denote the utility of party $i$ winning the seat while $W_j$ denotes the party's ally winning the seat. The payoffs are normalized so that the utility of the opposing bloc winning the seat is 0. It is natural to assume that $W_i > W_j$. Let $p_i$ denote the probability that party $i$ is the party within the bloc that wins the most votes. The expected utility of party $i$ is then:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i &= (1-p_w)0 + p_w[p_i W_i + (1-p_i)W_j] \\ &= p_w[p_i W_i + (1-p_i)W_j] \\ &= p_w p_i W_i + (p_w - p_w p_i)W_j \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

That is, with probability $(1-p_w)$, the opposing bloc wins and party $i$ gets a payoff of zero. With probability $p_w$, either party $i$ or party $j$ win the seat where $p_i$ is the probability of it being party $i$, resulting in a payoff of $W_i$.

Following Tsebelis, we assume defecting from the alliance increases the probability of party $i$ leading the bloc on the first ballot and decreases the probability of the party bloc winning the seat, i.e., $\frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} > 0$. Thus, the marginal effect of defection is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial d_i} &= \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i W_i + \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w W_i + \left( \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} - \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i - \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w \right) W_j \\ &= \left( \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i + \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w \right) (W_i - W_j) + \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} W_j \\ &= \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i (W_i - W_j) + \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w (W_i - W_j) + \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} W_j \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

It is reasonable to assume that the two marginal effects are at their maxima

when $p_i$ and $p_w$ are close to .5, i.e., when, respectively, the parties or blocs are perceived as having an equal chance of winning. Examining equation 3, note that the first and third term on the right-hand side are negative. Thus, defection can only be optimal if the second term, which is positive, is sufficiently large. By examination, the term $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w(W_i - W_j)$ will be large when the bloc is likely to win the seat in the constituency, the lead within the bloc is closely contested, and when the parties care a lot about whether they or their ally win the seat.

Intuitively, this stands to reason. Engaging in heated intra-bloc campaigning in the first round only makes sense if the parties have a reason to believe that the bloc's candidate will end up carrying the constituency *and* win a seat in parliament. In contrast, in a constituency where the left bloc is unlikely to win, the parties stand to gain little from advancing onto the second ballot. The parties' incentives are sketched out in figure 2 — the parties should only defect when the probability that the bloc wins the seat is high *and* the two allies are evenly matched.[3] In sum, assuming that the parties only care about advancing when they have a chance of winning yields more complex predictions — it is evident that the competitiveness within bloc and the competitiveness across blocs have an interactive effect on the incentive to turn against one's intra-bloc rival.

**FIGURE 2:** THE ROLE OF COMPETITIVENESS

| | $p_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$ | $p_i \not\approx \frac{1}{2}$ |
|---|---|---|
| $p_w$ *large* | DEFECT | COOPERATE |
| $p_w$ *small* | COOPERATE | COOPERATE |

Tsebelis's argument, of course, is slightly more complicated as he assumes that the parties may derive 'symbolic' utility from representing the bloc on the

[3]Note that it is possible that the effect of $p_w$ is non-monotonic when $p_i$ is close to one-half. That is, if the marginal effect of defection is large enough when $p_w$ is close to one-half then the parties may worry more about harming the bloc's chances of winning than the identity of the bloc's candidate.

second ballot. If the parties do receive positive 'symbolic' utility from being represented on the second ballot it implies that there is an additional incentive to defect whenever $p_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$. Thus, defection would be the optimal choice when $p_w$ is very low but as $p_w$ gets closer to $\frac{1}{2}$ the possibility of a defection handing the victory to the other bloc will induce the parties to cooperate.[4] But regardless of what concerns the candidates have in addition to winning a seat in the legislature, the effects of intra- and inter-bloc competition cannot be separated. The discussion above suggests, again, that the effects of intra- and inter-bloc competition interact, thereby affecting the degree of cohesion observed.

Following Tsebelis, in testing the hypotheses regarding how cohesive the blocs are, we focus on the degree to which the first-round bloc loser's supporters choose to transfer their vote to the bloc winner in the second round. Thus, the assumption is that the parties' actions towards members of their party bloc during the campaign affect the voters' willingness to transfer their support to other parties within the same bloc of parties.[5]

The two competition measures have a somewhat different relationship with the parties' strategies. The effect of the competition within the bloc is primarily driven by how the parties choose to campaign, i.e., voters are assumed to be less willing to transfer their votes when the campaign has emphasized the differences between the bloc's parties. In contrast, the effect of the competition between the left and the right blocs may or may not be due to campaign effects. That is, voters may well recognize on their own that their votes are more important in competitive races on the second ballot and, thus, it may have little to do with the parties' campaigns ahead of the first or the second ballot. Thus, the competition of the left and right does not speak clearly to the importance of the parties' campaigns. However, in our extension of Tsebelis's theoretical argument, we demonstrate that the effect of within-bloc competition should be conditioned by between-bloc competition, thus offering another test of the theory.

It is also important to note that Tsebelis' theory, as does our extension, only

[4] Naturally, if the parties assign a sufficiently high value to being represented on the second ballot they would be willing to throw away the possibility of the bloc winning the seat in favor of a spot on the second ballot. However, were that the case then it is doubtful that making a second-round agreement would make sense for the parties in the first place.

[5] Indridason (2008) finds that turnout is higher in constituencies where the two blocs are evenly matched on the first ballot. While he attributes that effect to strategic decisions about whether to turn out to vote, the finding is also consistent with the idea that parties may avoid alienating voters that may vote for them on the second ballot when they expect the second ballot to be closely contested. See also Fauvelle-Aymar & François (2006). Similar results have been obtained elsewhere De Paola & Scoppa (2014).

focuses on how the parties' strategies affect the vote transfers between the first and the second ballot and does not consider how the parties' campaigns might affect their performance on the first ballot. In that sense, the results here do not represent the 'total effect' of a party's decision to target members of the same bloc, i.e., the sum of the votes the party might gain on the first ballot and the vote transfers they might lose on the second ballot. Thus, one can view our results, and Tsebelis', as not speaking to whether the actions of individual parties are suboptimal in terms of their own performance. Instead they focus on the electoral fortunes of the bloc and asks whether the competition within the bloc has negative consequences.[6]

It is possible that factors other than the parties' criticism of one another affect voters' willingness to transfer their votes. In addition to the second-round withdrawal agreements, first-round nomination agreements are also quite common in France (Golder, 2006). A nomination agreement is an agreement between two or more parties to run a single candidate endorsed by the parties in a set of constituencies (as opposed to each of the parties running a separate candidate). It is possible that the presence of a nomination agreement affects voters' willingness to transfer their votes. In particular, supporters of candidates that are not included in the nomination agreements may perceive the nomination agreement to unfairly disadvantage their preferred candidate and may, therefore, be less willing to transfer their votes to the bloc's first-round winner.

## Conflict & Cooperation in 1978

We begin by analysing the 1978 French legislative elections that were the focus of Tsebelis's (1988a) work. We begin by replicating his results before re-examining the data to see whether the incentive to campaign against members of one's own bloc are maximized when inter- *and* intra-bloc competition is high.

We replicate Tsebelis's analysis using electoral data from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA). The data contains one observation for each party on the second ballot in each election. We exclude parties that face a competitor from the same bloc on the second ballot. In constructing the dataset, we identified the party affiliation of each candidate, calculated the vote shares of the candidate/blocs on the first and second ballot, and identified the party

[6]The assumption here is that the consequences of the parties' campaign primarily affects which of the bloc's parties the voter casts their vote for on the first ballot.

identity of the opponent of each party on the second ballot. Tsebelis' dependent variable, COHESION, is the change in a party's vote share from the first to the second ballot. The assumption is that the greater the increase in the number of votes won by the party, the greater the cohesion within the party's bloc. In line with Tsebelis's terminology, VICTORY is the competitiveness of the contest between the two blocs and PROXIMITY is the competitiveness of the contest within the bloc, i.e., between each bloc's parties.[7] The competitiveness measures range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating the parties are more evenly matched. OTHERS represents the vote share of parties that are neither aligned with the left nor the right bloc. For Tsebelis's ADVERSARY variable, we include indicator variables for the party of the opposing candidate.

Not having Tsebelis's original data was not much of an issue in analyzing vote transfers within the left bloc where our number of observations roughly matches Tsebelis (1988a) — in our re-analysis, we found 142 districts where the Communists (PC) were on the second ballot (141 in Tsebelis) and 262 districts where the Socialists were on the second ballot (263 in Tsebelis). Being based on official election data, there should be no ostensible difference, other than any corrections that may have been made over the years, which should not significantly affect results.

The discrepancy was larger on the right. In the CLEA data, there are several candidates only listed as DVD (Diverse droite) and the larger number of observations in Tsebelis (1988a) suggests that he was able to identify a number of these candidates as either members of the RPR or the UDF. We attempted to reconstruct, or approximate, Tsebelis's (1988a) sample by assuming that the DVD candidate in any first-round contest where there was a DVD candidate and either an RPR or a UDF candidate (but not both), represented whichever of the main right parties that was absent in the contest.[8] In many districts, this appears to be a reasonable assumption, but it is also clear that there are possibly instances where this leads us to incorrectly classify a DVD candidate as a UDF or a RPR candidate. Thus, while the assumption gets us some way towards the size of Tsebelis' sample, we present the results from analysis of data where we have not applied this assumption in table D.15 in appendix A — in which case our sample is a subset of Tsebelis' sample.

[7] Thus, VICTORY is defined as $1 - (v_L - v_R)$ where $v_b$ is that total vote of bloc $b$ on the first ballot. PROXIMITY is similarly defined as $1 - (v_1 - v_2)$ where $v_1$ and $v_2$ are the vote shares of the top two vote winning parties within a given bloc.

[8] Thus, if there was an RPR and a DVD candidate on the first ballot, but no UDF candidate, we assume that the DVD candidate was a UDF candidate.

It bears clarifying what our assumption entails. First, there are a number of districts contested by either the RPR or the UDF on the first round along with a DVD candidate and the DVD candidate advances onto the second ballot. These districts are included in our analysis, i.e., we assume that the DVD candidate represents the main right party that appears to be absent on the first ballot. This application of the assumption results in more districts being included in our analysis. Second, if we are to apply our assumption in a consistent manner, it also carries implications for districts in which a UDF or an RPR candidate wins a majority on the first ballot, and is, thus, elected. Tsebelis (1988a) argues that districts where only the RPR or the UDF ran a candidate, represent cases of 'maximum cohesion'.[9] Here, the application of our assumption about DVD candidates implies that we cannot consider the main parties to have coordinated on a single candidate when there is also a DVD candidate on the first ballot, i.e., we consider the DVD label to be a stand-in for a UDF or an RPR label. Thus, here our assumption results in dropping a few districts that otherwise would have been included in the analysis. On the whole, however, the assumption brings us closer to the number of observations for each party in Tsebelis (1990).

The original results from Tsebelis (1990) are presented in table 2.[10] However, our model demonstrates that the effects of the competitiveness of the contest — whether between or within blocs — ought not to be treated as independent of one another. That is, the value of being the bloc's representative on the second ballot is likely to depend on the bloc's likelihood of carrying the district. Therefore, in table 3, we introduce an interaction between VICTORY and PROXIMITY into the model specification.

The first thing to note about the results in table 3 is that the interaction does matter. To aid with the interpretation of the results, we plot the marginal effects of VICTORY and PROXIMITY in figures 3 and 4. In Tsebelis's account, VICTORY was predicted to increase cohesion and, thus, to have a positive marginal effect on vote change, and PROXIMITY was predicted to reduces cohesion and to have a negative marginal effect on the vote. We further argue that cohesiveness should be minimized when the bloc is certain to carry the district but the contest within the bloc is tight. Thus, we expect the marginal effect of VICTORY to

[9]This is perhaps debatable as the theoretical argument focuses on voters' reaction to the competition between the parties whereas Tsebelis' assumption about these districts focuses on the parties and not the voters. In fact, it might be reasonable to assume that the parties' incentives to coordinate would be greatest when voters are less likely to transfer their votes.

[10]The results of the replication using our data and our assumption about candidates labeled as DVD, are shown in Table D.15 in appendix A.

**TABLE 2:** RESULTS FROM TSEBELIS' (1990) 'NESTED GAMES'
— DEP. VARIABLE: CHANGE IN # VOTES FROM $1^{st}$ TO $2^{nd}$ BALLOT—

| | PARTY | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $PC$ | $PS$ | $UDF$ | $RPR$ |
| VICTORY | 0.43 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.5 |
| | (10.0) | (2.2) | (1.9) | (1.4) |
| PROXIMITY | −0.06 | 0.037 | −0.10 | −0.08 |
| | (−2.2) | (1.55) | (−6.7) | (−6.8) |
| ADV. | 0.002 | −0.00 | −0.02 | −0.02 |
| | (0.5) | (−0.4) | (−4.7) | (−4.7) |
| OTHERS | −0.36 | −0.25 | −0.02 | −0.44 |
| | (−5.8) | (−4.5) | (−6.3) | (−11.6) |
| CONSTANT | −0.36 | −0.07 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| | (−10.0) | (−1.9) | (1.1) | (2.0) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 141 | 263 | 205 | 243 |
| $R^2$ | 0.56 | 0.09 | 0.44 | 0.53 |

Re-created and reformatted from Tsebelis (1990), Ch. 7, Table 7.3. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

**TABLE 3:** MODELS FOR 1978 W/INTERACTION
— ASSUME: DVD → RPR/UDF —

| | (1) $PC$ | (2) $PS$ | (3) $UDF$ | (4) $RPR$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VICTORY | $-0.621^{*}$ | $1.022^{**}$ | $-2.270^{***}$ | $-3.467^{***}$ |
| | (0.364) | (0.484) | (0.720) | (1.291) |
| PROXIMITY | $-1.101^{***}$ | $1.012^{**}$ | $-3.059^{***}$ | $-5.113^{***}$ |
| | (0.370) | (0.511) | (0.839) | (1.437) |
| VICTORY × PROXIMITY | $1.128^{***}$ | $-1.009^{*}$ | $2.628^{***}$ | $4.816^{***}$ |
| | (0.401) | (0.538) | (0.909) | (1.527) |
| OTHER | $-0.532^{***}$ | $-0.666^{***}$ | $1.700^{***}$ | $1.228^{***}$ |
| | (0.054) | (0.056) | (0.394) | (0.418) |
| RPR | −0.002 | 0.011 | | |
| | (0.016) | (0.008) | | |
| UDF | −0.007 | $0.015^{*}$ | | |
| | (0.016) | (0.008) | | |
| SOC-MRG | | | 0.003 | 0.023 |
| | | | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| CONSTANT | $0.606^{*}$ | $-1.002^{**}$ | $2.612^{***}$ | $3.720^{***}$ |
| | (0.335) | (0.459) | (0.662) | (1.221) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 142 | 262 | 192 | 230 |
| $R^2$ | 0.68 | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.33 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p < 0.10, $^{**}$ p < 0.05, $^{***}$ p < 0.01

**FIGURE 3:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF VICTORY
—TABLE 3, MODELS 1-4, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




decline as PROXIMITY increases.[11] Examining the marginal effects of VICTORY in figure 3, one cannot confidently say that any of these expectations hold up without qualification. Only for the SOC-MRG do we find that an increase in VICTORY consistently has a positive effect on vote transfers, which declines as the competition between the blocs gets tighter. For the other parties we find that at lower levels of PROXIMITY, the marginal effect of VICTORY is negative and/or statistically insignificant. The effect is estimated to be positive for the Communists and the RPR when the intra-bloc contest is close, but those are the circumstances in which representing the bloc ought to be more valuable, leading to a more heated intra-bloc contest.

The effects of PROXIMITY appear to be more in line with expectations as can be seen in figure 4 except for the Socialists. For the other parties, an increase in PROXIMITY reduces vote transfers and, moreover, the magnitude of the effect declines as the race between the two blocs becomes tighter, suggesting that the parties aim to be more cohesive when inter-bloc conflict may risk the bloc's chances on the second ballot. However, the exact opposite appears to apply to the left bloc where the Socialists represent the bloc on the second ballot.

In summary, our reanalysis of the data from the 1978 election demonstrates that the relationship between vote transfers and VICTORY and PROXIMITY is less straightforward than the original analysis suggests. That is, while increases in intra-bloc competition tend to affect bloc cohesion negatively, we do find that the effect is conditioned by the degree of inter-bloc competition and, moreover, that the competitiveness of the contest between the blocs does not have an

[11] As we address in the next section, the relationship is slightly more complex as an increase in VICTORY can imply either that the party's chances are improving (as when it is trailing) or that they are getting worse (as when it is leading).

**FIGURE 4:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF PROXIMITY
—TABLE 3, MODELS 1-4, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




unambiguous effect on bloc cohesion.

It is important to note that Tsebelis (1990) does takes his analysis a bit further than we have done here by considering the role of 'visible' and 'invisible' politics where the idea is that the role of the bloc's runner-up (and its voters) is more salient in constituencies where the bloc, as a whole, is leading the contest on the first ballot. In those circumstances, whether the bloc runner-up's votes transfer to the bloc's candidate on the second ballot is typically pivotal to the bloc's chances of winning the seat. Thus, the greater stakes in such contests render them more visible. In contrast, where the bloc trails, the bloc runner-up's votes transfer are less likely to be consequential and attract less attention. The implication of the distinction between visible and invisible politics is that we should expect the implications of Tsebelis's (1990) theory to hold primarily hold for parties whose bloc is leading the contest whereas parties and voters should feel less constrained when the bloc is trailing. We explored this possibility and present the results in appendix A (tables A.7 and A.8). In short, while we do find that patterns of vote transfers differ depending on whether the bloc was leading or trailing, the results are no more consistent with the implications of the theory.

In line with Tsebelis's (1990) argument about visible and invisible politics, our simple model above suggests that the parties's incentives to cooperate depends not only on the competitiveness of the contest within the bloc but also on the bloc's probability of winning the seat. In the next section we thus maintain that assumption as we consider a different specification of the dependent variable that takes account of how many votes there are available for intra-bloc transfers and extend the analysis to more elections.

## Cohesion Beyond 1978

We now examine the robustness of the results above in two ways. First, we extend the analysis temporally using data on legislative elections from 1958-2012.[12] Second, we consider different operationalizations of some of the key variables in Tsebelis's analyses, including his dependent variable, that more closely fit the underlying theory.

Tsebelis measures vote transfers between parties of the same bloc as "the difference between the votes of a coalition in the second round and the sum of the votes of the partners in the first round" (1990, p. 204). Tsebelis's theory focuses on how successful a party is in attracting the votes of supporters of the bloc's parties that did not advance onto the second round. Thus, the effectiveness of the party's strategy, in terms of change in vote share, depends on how many voters supported the bloc's other parties on the first ballot and need to be induced to switch their votes. For instance, consider two districts where the Socialist party advances onto the second round and where the Communist party received 1% of the vote in the first district and 10% of the vote in the second. Suppose that in the first district, all the communist supporters support the socialist candidate on the second ballot (+1% pt.) while in the latter only half transfer their votes (+5% pts.). The latter situation would look like a much larger change, but proportionally, it is smaller, implying that the Socialists were less, and not more, successful in convincing the Communists' supporters to vote for the Socialists on the second ballot.

To account for the fact that the effect of the parties' strategies must be measured against what can possibly be achieved, we operationalize the dependent variable as the share of votes cast for the bloc's other parties on the first ballot. We denote the number of voters within bloc $b$ that cast for a party other than party $i$ as $n^b_{-i}$ and refer to these as *available bloc votes*. At best, party $i$ can then hope to increase their vote tally by $n^b_{-i}$ votes. At worst, none of the $n^b_{-i}$ voters transfer their votes. If adopting a less negative campaign towards the other parties within the bloc increases the probability of a voter casting a vote for party $i$ by $\Delta p$ then the total vote gain from the less negative campaign would be $\Delta p * n^b_{-i}$. Thus, if we were able to observe the actual behavior of the $n^b_{-i}$ voters,

[12] We obtain district-level electoral results from the Centre des données socio-politiques (1958-1968) (Converse & Pierce, 1967) and the constituency-level election archive (CLEA) (1973-2012) (Kollman et al., 2019). We exclude the 1968 special election, given its surrounding circumstances. The 2012 election is the last election we consider as the party system has been seen to have shed its two-bloc structure in the 2017 election (Gougou & Persico, 2017; Evans & Ivaldi, 2021).

then the success of party $i$'s strategy is the proportion of *available bloc voters* that cast a vote for party $i$ on the second ballot. Our operationalization approximates this proportion by considering the change in party $i$'s votes between the first and the second ballot as a share of the available bloc votes (party $i$'s votes in round 2 minus party $i$'s votes in round 1 divided by the available votes in the bloc, or $\frac{v_i^2 - v_i^1}{n_{-i}^b}$).

Our operationalization of the dependent variable is not perfect. It ignores, e.g., that some of the bloc's voters may have abstained on the first round, may abstain on the second round, and some may choose to vote for a party belonging to the other bloc. As with any measure based on aggregate data, it is not possible to account for these possibilities. Our measure, however, operationalizes the underlying theoretical argument better by taking into account what the parties can possibly achieve.[13]

We also operationalize the two main independent variables in a slightly different manner. In measuring the degree of competition i) between and ii) within blocs, Tsebelis focuses on the absolute difference in i) the total votes of all the parties within each bloc[14] and ii) the difference in the votes of the winner and the runner-up within each bloc. As we discussed above, the number of votes separating blocs or parties may not be an accurate measure of how competitive the contest is, as competitiveness is also a function of the total number of voters in the district. Accordingly, our measures of competitiveness are based on the differences in the *share of the vote* rather than the vote itself, with the within-bloc competition focusing on the share of the bloc's vote.[15] Thus, the

[13]The dependent variable can be considered a sum of the share of the available votes plus various random shocks, for example, turnout and campaign events, that can be thought of as measurement errors. Measurement error in the dependent variable leads to less efficient estimates but does not introduce bias as long as the measurement error is not correlated with the independent variables.

[14]This is our best guess at how Tsebelis operationalized this variable, although the original source is vague. The original text reads "I use the results of the first round as a proxy for this variable. This assumes that the parties have a fairly accurate perception of the electoral outcome, a legitimate assumption given the feedback from the electoral campaign that parties get both from their activists and the polls (which in France can be conducted but not published during the last week of the campaign). Once the anticipated result is equated with the actual result in the first round, the operationalization of the positioning variables victory and proximity is straightforward." (p. 204). We take this to mean that the anticipated outcome (expected vote) is going to be relatively accurate on the part of the parties, and therefore the actual difference between the results for each bloc's respective first-round votes should indicate the closeness of winning (victory) that district.

[15]Each party was classified as either extreme left, center-left, center-right, extreme-right, or center/other. These categories were adapted from the PARLGOV data on left-right positions. PARLGOV uses a "0–10 scale mean value in left/right dimension with data from Castles/Mair 1983, Huber/Inglehart 1995, Benoit/Laver 2006 and CHES 2010" (Parlgov http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/view_party/, Döring et al. (2022)). A PARLGOV score of 0-1.99 was coded as extreme left, 2-3.99 as center-left, 4-5.99 as center, 6-7.99 as center-right, and 8-10 as extreme right. This classification matches well with common perceptions of which parties belong to

variable LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION is the absolute difference in the vote shares of the left and right blocs, while WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITION is the difference in the vote share of the largest and second largest party within the bloc.

In addition to the operationalization of the key independent variables, we also include an interaction between the variables as the theoretical argument suggests that the propensity to 'play nice' is maximized when there is little competition within the bloc *and* the competition between the blocs is high.

Like Tsebelis, we account for against whom the party competes on the second ballot. Tsebelis's analysis included an indicator for the identity of the other party on the second ballot. As we cover more years, and thus a much greater variety of potential rivals, we simply include an indicator, RADICAL RIVAL, for whether the rival party on the second round was more radical than the mainstream party within the bloc. Thus, for example, for the rivals of right parties, a socialist candidate was coded as non-radical while a communist candidate was coded as radical.[16]

Finally, we consider whether the party belongs to the bloc leading the contest after the first round. Our LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION variable does not distinguish between situations where the party is, say, leading by two percentage points and trailing by two percentage points. In terms of determining the outcome of the contest between the left and right, those two scenarios may not be all that different qualitatively, i.e., both reflect a highly competitive race where every vote may count. It may, however, affect the parties' considerations in terms of the within-bloc contest. The former scenario raises the stakes of the competition within the bloc as the chance of winning the district is higher, creating a greater incentive to campaign against their rival within their bloc. This incentive naturally grows larger if the margin between the left and right blocs is larger.

## Results

Our data spans multiple elections and we, therefore, use multilevel models to estimate the effects of our explanatory variables. We include random ef-

which bloc. Data on the left-right position of two parties was missing. These parties (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouverière and Front de Gauche) were coded using the Comparative Manifesto Project's 'rile' variable (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/down/tutorials/main-dataset.html). Both the parties were coded as left parties, having left (-19.4 = 2 for the SFIO) and extreme left (-47.925 = 1 for the FG) positions.

[16] In appendix D we estimate individual models for each party and election where we include indicators for the revival parties as Tsebelis does.

fects for election year and allow for random slope coefficients for each of our competitiveness variables.

As our extension of Tsebelis' argument implies a triple interaction, we present two sets of models to aid with the interpretation of the results. First, in the first two columns of table 4 below, we run the model separately for parties whose bloc is trailing, i.e., has won fewer votes on the first ballot, and parties whose bloc is leading.[17] Second, in the third column, we present a version of the model where we simply use dummy variables to indicate whether the left-right contest is competitive, whether the within-bloc contest is competitive, and whether the party's bloc is leading or trailing. This simplified model may sacrifice a lot of the nuance that the more complicated model can capture but it does capture the main insights of the theory in a manner that is substantially easier to digest. The choice of what counts as a competitive contest is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. Here we define 'competitive' as a margin of less than three percentage points but we present results for alternative thresholds of competitiveness in table B.9 in the appendix.

Consider first models 1 and 2 in table 4. To ease the interpretation of the results, we graph the marginal effects of the main variables of interest. Starting with the effects of a change in competition between the parties of the same bloc, figure 5 shows the effect of within-bloc competition over a range of values of within-bloc competition at two different levels of competition between the two ideological blocs (a highly competitive one and a uncompetitive one).

The first thing to note about figure 5 is that greater within-bloc competitiveness generally does not appear to have much effect on vote transfer to the party that advanced onto the second ballot. The estimated effect fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in most conditions, the exception being contests where the left and right blocs are fairly evenly matched. While within-bloc competition is estimated to have a negative effect on vote transfers when there is not much competition within the bloc, the negative effect declines and eventually becomes positive when the contest is tight. This runs counter to expectations as more intense competition within the bloc is expected to increase competition for votes and result in less, and not more, vote transfers. Within-bloc competition only seems to matter when the competition between the bloc is sufficiently intense (see gray line, right panel) but, again, the effect is almost the opposite of what is expected as — the parties within the bloc should

[17] This, of course, is essentially the same as interacting the leading interaction with all of the competitiveness variables.

**FIGURE 5:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITION
—TABLE 4, MODELS 1-2, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




have the greatest incentive to campaign against one another they are in a fierce competition within one another *and* when a first-ballot win is likely to translate into a win on the second ballot. Instead, we find that vote transfers actually increase with greater within-bloc competition when the left and right blocs are evenly matched. Finally, it is noteworthy that the estimated confidence intervals are much larger when the bloc is trailing (see left panel). This may simply reflect the fact that, on average, there is less at stake in these contests, i.e., when the chance of carrying the district is very small there may be greater heterogeneity in the parties' responses to within-bloc competition — some candidates may see little point in attacking ideological neighbors in those circumstances while others may fight for pride.

Figure 6 shows the marginal effect of a change in competitiveness between the left and the right blocs at different levels of competitiveness within the party's bloc, again, considering separately districts where the party's bloc is trailing (left panel) and leading (right panel). When trailing on the first ballot we find that an increase in left-right competition generally estimated to have a negative effect on vote transfers, with the effect trending towards zero (and

**TABLE 4:** SHARE OF AVAILABLE BLOC VOTES WON

| | (1) *Trailing* | (2) *Leading* | (3) *Leading Indic.* |
|---|---|---|---|
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | 0.0984 | $0.0452^{***}$ | $-0.5189^{***}$ |
| | (0.0732) | (0.0082) | (0.0790) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP.$^2$ | 0.0043 | $0.0023^{***}$ | |
| | (0.0028) | (0.0003) | |
| L-R COMP. | $-0.0004$ | $0.0125^{***}$ | $-0.1670^{***}$ |
| | (0.0032) | (0.0018) | (0.0597) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. $\times$ L-R COMP. | $-0.0006$ | $0.0018^{***}$ | 0.2769 |
| | (0.0007) | (0.0003) | (0.1712) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP.$^2$ $\times$ L-R COMP. | $-0.0001^{***}$ | $0.0001^{***}$ | |
| | (0.0000) | (0.0000) | |
| VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES | $0.0234^{***}$ | $0.0214^{***}$ | $0.0168^{***}$ |
| | (0.0028) | (0.0013) | (0.0019) |
| RADICAL RIVAL | $0.2677^{***}$ | $0.0520^{**}$ | $0.1495^{***}$ |
| | (0.0431) | (0.0205) | (0.0309) |
| LEADING BLOC | | | $-0.7017^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.1363) |
| LEADING BLOC $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | | | $0.3483^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.0939) |
| LEADING BLOC $\times$ L-R COMP. | | | $0.5970^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.1796) |
| LEADING BLOC $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. $\times$ L-R COMP. | | | $-0.7893^{**}$ |
| | | | (0.3719) |
| CONSTANT | $1.5382^{***}$ | $1.1492^{***}$ | $2.0168^{***}$ |
| | (0.3912) | (0.0936) | (0.2730) |
| var(YEAR) | $0.2496^{***}$ | $0.0565^{***}$ | $0.2315^{***}$ |
| | (0.1138) | (0.0252) | (0.1005) |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC) | $0.0960^{***}$ | $0.0008^{***}$ | $0.0157^{**}$ |
| | (0.0473) | (0.0003) | (0.0282) |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC$^2$) | $0.0001^{***}$ | $0.0000^{***}$ | |
| | (0.0001) | (0.0000) | |
| var(L-R COMP) | 0.0000 | $0.0000^{***}$ | $0.0137^{***}$ |
| | (0.0000) | (0.0000) | (0.0144) |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC $\times$ L-R COMP) | $0.0000^{***}$ | $0.0000^{***}$ | $0.0000^{***}$ |
| | (0.0000) | (0.0000) | (0.0000) |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC $^2\times$ L-R COMP) | $0.0000^{***}$ | $0.0000^{***}$ | |
| | (0.0000) | (0.0000) | |
| var(LEADING BLOC) | | | $0.3112^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.1189) |
| var(LEADING $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP) | | | $0.0000^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.0000) |
| var(LEADING $\times$ L-R COMP.) | | | $0.4238^{*}$ |
| | | | (0.1992) |
| var(LEADING $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC $\times$ L-R COMP.) | | | 0.4751 |
| | | | (0.4473) |
| var(CONSTANT) | 2.1590 | $0.0345^{***}$ | 1.0207 |
| | (1.3347) | (0.0196) | (0.3429) |
| var(RESIDUAL) | $0.6326^{***}$ | $0.1596^{***}$ | $0.7134^{***}$ |
| | (0.0154) | (0.0037) | (0.0117) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 3684 | 3878 | 7562 |
| LOG LIKELIHOOD | $-4605.944$ | $-2104.12$ | $-9586.61$ |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**FIGURE 6:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION
—TABLE 4, MODELS 1-2, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




non-significance) as within-bloc competition increases. Again, this is not completely in line with expectation — as the race between the blocs becomes more competitive, we should see an increase in vote transfers and that effect should be stronger where the strength of parties within the same bloc is more uneven. The hypothesis fares better when considering races when the party's bloc is leading — here an increase in left-right competitiveness increases vote transfers but the magnitude of the effect declines the more intense the competition within the bloc.[18]

The third model replaces our continuous measures of competitiveness with simple indicator variables for whether the contest was competitive within and across blocs as well as for whether the party's bloc was leading or trailing. Apart from easing interpretation of the model, it makes certain sense to separate out context that might be considered competitive from those where there is little or no competition. One reason is that it might be expected that our independent variables have an effect in some contexts and not others, or simply for the effect to vary in magnitude across those contexts. This can, of course, be approximated by introducing additional interactions and Taylor polynomials but doing so

[18]It bears noting, however, that there is a slight suggestion that this relationship reverses at high levels of within-bloc competition (>-10% pts).

**FIGURE 7:** EFFECT OF WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITIVENESS
—CONDITIONAL ON LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITIVENESS & LEADING/TRAILING BLOC—
— 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




comes at a greater cost, both in terms of complexity and demands placed on the model estimation. Using indicator variables also involves subjective decisions about when a contest is competitive and when not. Here we consider races with a margin of less than three percentage pts. to be competitive.

Figure 7 graphs the estimated effects of a change in within-bloc competitiveness conditional on whether the contest between the two blocs is competitive and whether the party's bloc is leading or trailing. The results indicate that a lower share of available votes is transferred in competitive within-bloc contests regardless of left-right competition and whether the party is leading or trailing. The magnitude of the effect varies, however. The effect is stronger in non-competitive bloc contests when the party's bloc is trailing than when the bloc is leading — indicating that when a second-round victory is more certain, voters are more likely, contrary to expectations, to transfer their votes. Considering how a competitive contest between the bloc conditions the effect of within-bloc competition, we find that there are less vote transfers in competitive districts — when, instead, one would expect voters to be more likely to transfer their votes for fear of handing the victory over to the opposite bloc.

Figure 8 plots the effect of left-right competitiveness — conditional on within-bloc competitiveness and whether a party's bloc is leading or trailing — on vote transfers. The effect of left-right competition is estimated to be positive except for contests where the party's bloc is trailing and the within-bloc contest is not competitive. The effect is, however, only statistically significant at the

**FIGURE 8:** EFFECT OF LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITIVENESS
—CONDITIONAL ON WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITIVENESS & LEADING/TRAILING BLOC—
— 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




conventional levels when the bloc is leading and within-bloc competition is low. In contrast, the effect is substantially lower and not statistically significant when the bloc's parties are in competition for a place on the second ballot. This suggests that the competition within the bloc counteracts any positive effects on the vote that greater competition between the blocs may bring, which is in line with expectations. Left-right competitiveness, however, has a greater effect when there is competition within the bloc, which runs counter to expectations, perhaps suggesting that vote transfers suffer when there is little to get voters fired up about the election, i.e., when the bloc is likely to lose and there is little competition for a place on the second ballot.

Finally, Figure 9 shows the effect of going from trailing to leading in the first round, conditional on the competitiveness between the left and right and within one's own bloc. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of belonging to the leading bloc is estimated to affect vote transfers negatively. Similar to the pattern we saw in Figure 7, a low-stake contest, i.e., a non-competitive race on both the left-right and within-bloc fronts, is associated with a larger decline in vote transfers. The effect is statistically undistinguishable in the other three context although the negative effect is smallest, and close to zero, when there is competition between the blocs but not within the party — this is in line with expectations, but the estimates are too imprecise to attach much confidence to the difference.

**FIGURE 9:** EFFECT OF BLOC LEADING
—CONDITIONAL ON WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITIVENESS & LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITIVENESS—
– 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




# Conclusion

Political parties in multiparty democracies are rarely in the position of having the electoral or legislative strength to form a single-party majority government. Thus, one of the challenges parties face is whether, and when, to form coalitions with other parties. Parties can wait until after elections but often there are strong incentives to form coalitions ahead of elections, e.g., to take advantage of the superadditive nature of many electoral systems (Golder, 2006). Some electoral systems, such as runoff elections, however, reduce the incentive to coalesce ahead of elections as they, essentially, circumvent the coordination problem parties face. A failure to coordinate on the first ballot has limited consequences as the coordination problem can be solved on the second ballot — and, indeed, thresholds of participation on the second ballot effectively force such coordination.

However, as Tsebelis (1988a) points out, runoff elections do not automatically solve such coordination problems as the very parties that wish to work together still face competitive pressures to ensure that they are the focus of the coordinating efforts. In other words, while sharing ideological preferences, or belonging to the same bloc, each party would rather be the party representing the coalition or bloc than to simply lend support to an ideologically similar party. And, as Tsebelis (1988a) correctly notes, this creates incentives for members of the same bloc to campaign against one another with the risk of harming the performance of the bloc as a whole. These incentives would then be stronger when the members of the bloc are evenly matched electorally or when the bloc

is likely to carry the constituency.

We build on Tsebelis's (1988a) analysis both by extending his theoretical argument and by examining the implications of the theory across a larger set of elections. As Tsebelis pointed out, the 1978 election was a good case for testing the theory and, accordingly, we started by examining that election and comparing our findings with those of Tsebelis (1988a). Noting that the incentive to campaign against members of one's own bloc depends on both the competition within the bloc and the competitiveness of the race between the two blocs — representing the bloc on the second ballot is not worth much if the bloc's chances of carrying the seat are vanishingly small — we find limited support for the theory when analyzing the 1978 election.

Extending our analysis beyond 1978, we also note that there are improvements to be made in measuring the level of competitiveness that may account for why the reanalysis of the 1978 election does not provide compelling evidence in support of the theory. Additionally we note that focusing on the vote margin between the two blocs does not fully capture the incentives facing the parties — the temptation to attack your main competitor within your own bloc is likely to be stronger when your bloc is, say, 5 points ahead than when it is trailing by 5 points. Analyzing all legislative elections from 1958 to 2012 (apart from the 1968 election held under proportional representation), we do find that competition within the bloc tends to reduce vote transfers to the party that advances onto the second ballot. Interestingly, competition within the bloc tends to have a larger effect when the two blocs are evenly matched and, moreover, the vote transfers increase if the race between the left and the right blocs is close enough. Finally, these effects are only observed when the bloc was leading on the first round.

The effect of greater competition on vote transfers within the blocs depends on whether the bloc is leading or trailing. If the bloc is leading, then a more competitive contest between the left and the right results in more vote transfers and the magnitude of the vote transfers depends on how close the contest within the bloc is. If the bloc had a clear winner on the first ballot, the magnitude of the effect is substantial but it declines as the contest within the bloc becomes closer. In contrast, when the party's bloc was trailing on the first ballot, an increase in left-right bloc competition reduces vote transfers when the bloc's parties are unevenly matched. When there is stiff competition for representing the bloc on the second ballot the effect, somewhat surprisingly, disappears.

On the whole, there are clear indications that competition does influence the transfer of votes between the two ballots. This is most clear with respect

to competition within the bloc — vote transfers are lower in competitive races. The results with regard to the competition between the left and the right are a bit more nuanced. In particular, whether we find an effect depends on the degree of competitiveness within the bloc. Competition between the left and right blocs effectively has no effect when there is competition within the bloc. This suggests that the effects of intra-bloc competition tend to dominate the effects of inter-bloc competition. In contrast, inter-bloc competition matters when who will represent the bloc on the second ballot is clear. The manner in which it matters does, however, depend on the expected outcome on the second ballot. In situations where the bloc appeared stronger on the first ballot, i.e., in circumstances where vote transfers are more likely to be pivotal and are, therefore, more likely to attract attention as Tsebelis argued, inter-bloc competition results in greater transfers. If the bloc was trailing on the first ballot, the opposite occurs and vote transfers are less likely to occur.

Our theory emphasizes the lack of competitiveness within the bloc meaning that there is no reason to attack challengers within the bloc and, thus, voters are not dissuaded from casting their votes for the bloc's second ballot representative even though it is not their most preferred candidate. While the results are largely consistent with our hypotheses it is important to acknowledge that there are alternative mechanisms that could potentially explain similar patterns. These include, for example, explanations rooted in political psychology, such as a bandwagon effect, which can be thought of as getting some utility from voting for a 'winner' (Callander, 2007; Granzier et al., 2021). It is not clear, however, that such bandwagon effects can explain why the magnitude of the effect depends on the degree of competition within the bloc. In races where the bloc is trailing but there is a clear leader within the bloc, greater left-right competitiveness, counter to expectations, reduces vote transfers. One possibility here, related to the idea of a bandwagon effect, is that supporters of parties that do not make it onto the second ballot do not turn out on the second ballot as they expect their bloc to lose, i.e., the probability of voting for a 'winner' is lower and, thus, the expected utility of voting is not significant enough to make turning out worthwhile. While our data does not permit it, future research might examine the exact mechanism that drive the patterns of vote transfers that we observe.

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# Appendix

## A Additional results for analysis of the 1978 election

Table D.15 replicates Tsebelis's (1988a) models using the data we collected. As noted in the body of the article, the number of observations for each party didn't align perfectly with what is reported in (Tsebelis, 1988a). The discrepancies were larger for the parties of the right bloc. While the absence of some districts from our sample can, of course, affect the results, there is no reason to think that the relationship hypothesized by Tsebelis (1988a) should not hold in this sample. Of course, the power of the analysis is reduced because of the smaller sample size — thus, while the standard errors of the estimated coefficients may be larger, we would not expect the coefficients themselves to be radically different.

Overall, the results are fairly similar with some exceptions. Tsebelis's (1988a) results were consistent with his hypotheses about victory and proximity for all of the parties except the Socialist Party where the effect of proximity was not in line with expectations. In our replication we find i) that proximity does have an effect for the Socialist Party but that it is opposite to expectations and ii) that victory does not have an effect for the UDF. Other than that, the substantive conclusions with regard to the key variables are the same.

In his analysis, Tsebelis (1988a) assumes that districts where the right bloc fielded a single candidate on the first ballot represent cases of high levels of cooperation, or alternatively, complete absence of competition between the main parties within the bloc. As this strikes us as a qualitatively different situation from when both the main right parties are present on the first ballot, we reran our model excluding these observations. As A.6 shows, the results are similar with the main difference being that the magnitude of the effect of proximity drops somewhat.

**TABLE A.5:** VOTE TRANSFERS IN THE 1978 ELECTION
— ASSUME: DVD → RPR/UDF —

| | (1) $PC$ | (2) $PS$ | (3) $UDF$ | (4) $RPR$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VICTORY | $0.397^{***}$ | $0.114^{***}$ | $-0.255$ | $0.558^{***}$ |
| | (0.034) | (0.026) | (0.183) | (0.200) |
| PROXIMITY | $-0.064^{**}$ | $0.054^{**}$ | $-0.641^{***}$ | $-0.585^{***}$ |
| | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.066) | (0.071) |
| OTHER | $-0.536^{***}$ | $-0.669^{***}$ | $1.801^{***}$ | $1.423^{***}$ |
| | (0.055) | (0.056) | (0.400) | (0.422) |
| RPR | 0.000 | 0.012 | | |
| | (0.016) | (0.008) | | |
| UDF | $-0.004$ | $0.016^{**}$ | | |
| | (0.016) | (0.008) | | |
| SOC-MRG | | | 0.000 | 0.029 |
| | | | (0.018) | (0.019) |
| CONSTANT | $-0.329^{***}$ | $-0.141^{***}$ | $0.762^{***}$ | $-0.077$ |
| | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.174) | (0.208) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 142 | 262 | 192 | 230 |
| $R^2$ | 0.66 | 0.39 | 0.36 | 0.30 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

**TABLE A.6:** VOTE TRANSFERS IN THE 1978 ELECTION
— EXCL. FIRST-ROUND COORDINATED AMONG RIGHT PARTIES —

| | (1) $UDF$ | (2) $RPR$ | (3) $UDF2$ | (4) $RPR2$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VICTORY | $-0.137$ | $0.692^{***}$ | $-2.648^{***}$ | $-2.970^{**}$ |
| | (0.177) | (0.180) | (0.780) | (1.476) |
| PROXIMITY | $-0.347^{***}$ | $-0.243^{***}$ | $-3.259^{***}$ | $-4.298^{***}$ |
| | (0.073) | (0.071) | (0.885) | (1.624) |
| OTHER | $1.488^{***}$ | $1.344^{***}$ | $1.451^{***}$ | $1.232^{***}$ |
| | (0.378) | (0.369) | (0.367) | (0.368) |
| SOC-MRG | $0.050^{***}$ | $0.074^{***}$ | $0.049^{***}$ | $0.067^{***}$ |
| | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.017) |
| VICTORY × PROXIMITY | | | $3.126^{***}$ | $4.277^{**}$ |
| | | | (0.947) | (1.711) |
| CONSTANT | $0.367^{**}$ | $-0.533^{***}$ | $2.708^{***}$ | $2.951^{**}$ |
| | (0.180) | (0.193) | (0.730) | (1.407) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 175 | 212 | 175 | 212 |
| $R^2$ | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.28 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

## Leading Bloc or Trailing Bloc

Tsebelis (1990) notes that whether the bloc is leading or trailing may matter for vote transfer because the visibility of the actions of the bloc's runner-up. When the results of the first ballot suggest that the party's bloc has the votes to carry the district, the onus is on the bloc's runner-up to deliver the votes. That is, with their votes the bloc's candidate stands to win but without them a loss is (or may be) assured. In contrast, if the first ballot results have the bloc trailing, then its candidate will likely lose and, thus, the actions of the bloc's runner up have little consequence and attract little attention. Following Tsebelis's (1990) lead, we estimate the models in table 3 on the subsamples where each parties' bloc was leading and trailing. The results are presented in tables A.7 and A.8. The marginal effects of VICTORY and PROXIMITY are plotted in figures A.10 and A.11.

The first thing to note is it does appear to matter whether the bloc leads or trails but the results are not entirely in line with expectations. The first row of panels in each graph are the scenarios where the party's bloc is leading and vote transfers conform with the hypotheses. In the second row of panels, the party's bloc is trailing and the party's actions are less consequential. Starting with the effect of greater competitiveness between the blocs, when the party's bloc is leading, we can see that greater competitiveness generally leads to more vote transfers among the left parties, whereas, contrary to expectations, vote transfers are estimated to decline among the right parties. Turning to the districts where the party's bloc is trailing, there are no indications of increased inter-bloc competition having an effect on vote transfers to communist candidates but the estimates are based on very few observations (27) that is reflected in the very large confidence intervals. The results for socialist candidates indicate that the vote share of the socialists increases more as competition increases but that the magnitude of the effect declines and becomes statistically insignificant when there is a high degree of intra-bloc competition, running counter to the argument that parties and voters are less concerned when their bloc is trailing and their actions should draw less attention. On the right, greater inter-bloc competition is correlated with greater increases in vote transfers but counter to the hypothesized effects of intra-bloc competition, the effect of inter-bloc competition increased when there was more competition within the bloc on the first ballot although the interaction coefficient is only statistically significant at the 90% level.

Turning to the effect of greater intra-bloc competition, PROXIMITY, there are slight indications that vote transfers decline on the left when the bloc is leading but it is only statistically significant for communist candidates. In both instances the magnitude of the effect declines the more competitive the contest between the blocs is but only in a significant manner for the communists. When the left bloc is trailing, we effectively find no effect for the communists while there is a positive effect of intra-bloc competition on vote transfers for the communists that declines the more competitive the contest between the blocs is. On the right, greater intra-bloc competition has the expected effect when the right bloc is trailing and the magnitude of the effect becomes weaker the more competition there is between the blocs. In contrast, when the bloc leads, the estimates suggest that greater proximity decreases vote transfers, but only when the contest between the blocs is sufficiently close.

To briefly summarize, the results neither provide strong support for VICTORY and PROXIMITY mattering in the manner hypothesize nor that those effects are conditioned by whether politics are visible or invisible (i.e., whether the bloc leads or trails). On the latter point, the patterns of vote transfers do differ significantly — especially on the right — depending on whether the bloc leads or trails. However, the way that they differ does not line up with Tsebelis' argument about visible and invisible politics. That said, as we discuss further in the body of the article, not all contests are equal. In some constituencies, a party may face a large pool of voters that voted for some other party within their bloc on the first ballot while in others that pool may be much smaller. If that pool is small, the party can not hope for a big vote increase on the second ballot — no matter how competitive the race may be. These results must thus be taken with a grain of salt and in the extension of our analysis, which includes the 1978 election, we thus focus on the party's success in terms of the share of available votes (i.e., votes for other parties within the bloc on the first ballot).

**TABLE A.7:** VOTE TRANSFERS WHEN BLOC LEADS (1978 W/INTERACTION)
— ASSUME: DVD → RPR/UDF —

| | (1) $PC$ | (2) $PS$ | (3) $UDF$ | (4) $RPR$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VICTORY | $-0.744^{**}$ | $-0.175$ | $0.248$ | $0.248$ |
| | $(0.312)$ | $(0.426)$ | $(0.458)$ | $(0.928)$ |
| PROXIMITY | $-1.272^{***}$ | $-0.479$ | $2.060^{***}$ | $1.784$ |
| | $(0.316)$ | $(0.455)$ | $(0.573)$ | $(1.088)$ |
| VICTORY × PROXIMITY | $1.282^{***}$ | $0.505$ | $-2.499^{***}$ | $-2.198^{*}$ |
| | $(0.345)$ | $(0.479)$ | $(0.629)$ | $(1.162)$ |
| OTHER | $-0.487^{***}$ | $-0.489^{***}$ | $0.103$ | $-0.126$ |
| | $(0.047)$ | $(0.059)$ | $(0.264)$ | $(0.296)$ |
| UDF | $-0.003$ | $0.014$ | | |
| | $(0.002)$ | $(0.009)$ | | |
| RPR | | $0.012$ | | |
| | | $(0.009)$ | | |
| SOC-MRG | | | $-0.090^{***}$ | $-0.091^{***}$ |
| | | | $(0.016)$ | $(0.020)$ |
| CONSTANT | $0.740^{**}$ | $0.165$ | $0.202$ | $0.210$ |
| | $(0.285)$ | $(0.404)$ | $(0.412)$ | $(0.871)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 115 | 133 | 85 | 92 |
| $R^2$ | 0.77 | 0.54 | 0.77 | 0.64 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

**TABLE A.8:** VOTE TRANSFERS WHEN BLOC TRAILS (1978 W/INTERACTION)
— ASSUME: DVD → RPR/UDF —

| | (1) $PC$ | (2) $PS$ | (3) $UDF$ | (4) $RPR$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VICTORY | 0.204 | 1.785** | 1.005** | 1.267*** |
| | (10.448) | (0.875) | (0.445) | (0.351) |
| PROXIMITY | 0.247 | 1.841** | −0.892* | −0.728* |
| | (10.448) | (0.916) | (0.480) | (0.382) |
| VICTORY × PROXIMITY | −0.307 | −1.920** | 0.874* | 0.692* |
| | (10.829) | (0.962) | (0.497) | (0.400) |
| OTHER | −0.669** | −0.892*** | −0.021 | −0.277** |
| | (0.243) | (0.072) | (0.127) | (0.114) |
| RPR | 0.004 | 0.017* | | |
| | (0.026) | (0.009) | | |
| UDF | −0.001 | 0.017* | | |
| | (0.027) | (0.009) | | |
| SOC-MRG | | | −0.017*** | −0.016*** |
| | | | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| CONSTANT | −0.145 | −1.682** | −0.959** | −1.200*** |
| | (10.092) | (0.833) | (0.430) | (0.336) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 27 | 129 | 107 | 138 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.57 | 0.93 | 0.95 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

**FIGURE A.10:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF VICTORY
WHEN PARTY'S BLOC IS LEADING AND TRAILING
—TABLES A.7 & A.8, MODELS 1-4, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




**FIGURE A.11:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF PROXIMITY
WHEN PARTY'S BLOC IS LEADING AND TRAILING
—TABLES A.7 & A.8, MODELS 1-4, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—



# B Alternative Competitiveness Thresholds

In column 3, table 4 we used indicator for whether the contests between the left and right bloc and between the parties within the bloc were competitive, where we defined a competitive race as a race where less than three percentage points separated the parties. We think the choice of three percentage point is reasonable, while somewhat arbitrary. In table B.9, we present the results for two additional thresholds, five and ten percentage points, along with the original model for comparison. The signs of the coefficients remain the same, while the statistical significance of some of them, notably the left-right competition indicator and the interaction between the two competition indicators, changes. However, focusing on individual coefficients only tells a part of the story in models with interaction terms and when examined in that context the results are fairly similar in substantive terms.

**TABLE B.9:** SHARE OF AVAILABLE BLOC VOTES WON
— DIFFERENT THRESHOLD FOR CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRICT BEING COMPETITIVE —

| | COMPETITIVENESS: | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $< 3\%$ | $< 5\%$ | $< 10\%$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.5189^{***}$ | $-0.7594^{***}$ | $-0.8622^{***}$ |
| | (0.0790) | (0.1135) | (0.1278) |
| L-R COMP. | $-0.1670^{***}$ | $-0.1170^{*}$ | $-0.0285$ |
| | (0.0597) | (0.0612) | (0.1068) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. × L-R COMP. | $0.2769$ | $0.2424^{**}$ | $0.1120$ |
| | (0.1712) | (0.1104) | (0.0715) |
| LEADING BLOC | $-0.7017^{***}$ | $-0.7770^{***}$ | $-0.9723^{***}$ |
| | (0.1363) | (0.1394) | (0.1524) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. × LEADING BLOC | $0.3483^{***}$ | $0.4530^{***}$ | $0.5640^{***}$ |
| | (0.0939) | (0.0773) | (0.0771) |
| L-R COMP. × LEADING BLOC | $0.5970^{***}$ | $0.4865^{***}$ | $0.4501^{***}$ |
| | (0.1796) | (0.1294) | (0.0990) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. × L-R COMP. × LEADING | $-0.7893^{**}$ | $-0.3833^{**}$ | $-0.3509^{***}$ |
| | (0.3719) | (0.1644) | (0.1017) |
| VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES | $0.0168^{***}$ | $0.0172^{***}$ | $0.0175^{***}$ |
| | (0.0019) | (0.0019) | (0.0019) |
| RADICAL RIVAL | $0.1495^{***}$ | $0.1451^{***}$ | $0.1411^{***}$ |
| | (0.0309) | (0.0306) | (0.0301) |
| CONSTANT | $2.0168^{***}$ | $2.0752^{***}$ | $2.2039^{***}$ |
| | (0.2730) | (0.2771) | (0.2876) |
| var(YEAR) | $0.2315^{***}$ | $0.2367^{***}$ | $0.2260^{***}$ |
| | (0.1005) | (0.1028) | (0.0985) |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC COMP.) | $0.0157^{**}$ | $0.1296^{***}$ | $0.2210^{***}$ |
| | (0.0282) | (0.0753) | (0.0959) |
| var(L-R COMP.) | $0.0137^{***}$ | $0.0226^{***}$ | $0.1553^{***}$ |
| | (0.0144) | (0.0178) | (0.0865) |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC COMP × L-R COMP.) | $<0.0001$ | $<0.0001$ | $<0.0001$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| var(LEADING) | $0.3112^{***}$ | $0.3236^{***}$ | $0.3807^{**}$ |
| | (0.1189) | (0.1243) | (0.1464) |
| var(LEADING × WITHIN-BLOC COMP.) | $<0.0001$ | $<0.0001$ | $0.0148^{***}$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ | (0.0159) |
| var(LEADING × L-R COMP.) | $0.4238^{*}$ | $0.1943^{***}$ | $0.0905^{***}$ |
| | (0.1992) | (0.1035) | (0.0835) |
| var(LEADING × WITHIN-COMP. × LR COMP.) | $0.4751$ | $<0.0001$ | $<0.0001$ |
| | (0.4473) | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| var(CONSTANT) | $1.0207$ | $1.0533$ | $1.1708$ |
| | (0.3429) | (0.3542) | (0.3995) |
| var(RESIDUAL) | $0.7134^{***}$ | $0.7023^{***}$ | $0.6719^{***}$ |
| | (0.0117) | (0.0115) | (0.0111) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 7562 | 7562 | 7562 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

# C Available Votes: Alternative Definition

One potential shortcoming of our operationalization of the dependent variable — *Available Bloc Votes* — is that it considers potential new votes for a given party as only possibly coming from other parties within the party bloc. While a fairly reasonable assumption, we have operationalized an alternative dependent variable in the form of *Available Votes* — where *Available Votes* is defined as votes for members of the party's bloc and centrist or other parties that aren't clearly identified as members of either bloc — in order to determine whether this makes a large difference to our results.[19] The results of the estimation using the alternative definition are shown in Table C.10 and figures C.12-C.13. The results are substantively similar to the results reported in the body of the article although the effects are substantively smaller — the y-axis in the figures have been kept the same as in the earlier figures to facilitate comparison. This stands to reason as voters that don't align with either bloc, based on their votes on the first ballot, are i) not expected to align with one bloc over the other on the second ballot, and ii) are, perhaps, less likely to be affected by the campaign rhetoric used by competitors within the same bloc.

[19] That is, our original definition of available bloc votes is $\frac{\Delta v_i}{v_b(i)}$ whereas the alternative operationalization is $\frac{\Delta v_i}{v_b(i)+v_o}$ where $v_b(i)$ denotes the total votes of for the parties belonging to party $i$'s bloc and $v_o$ are the total votes for parties that are neither members of the left or the right bloc.

**TABLE C.10:** SHARE OF ALL AVAILABLE VOTES WON

| | (1) *Trailing* | (2) *Leading* |
|---|---|---|
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $0.0400^{***}$ | $0.0229^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0053)$ | $(0.0035)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP.$^2$ | $0.0013^{***}$ | $0.0008^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0002)$ | $(0.0001)$ |
| L-R COMP. | $0.0060^{**}$ | $0.0101^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0025)$ | $(0.0009)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. $\times$ L-R COMP. | $0.0005$ | $0.0011^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0004)$ | $(0.0001)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP.$^2$ $\times$ L-R COMP. | $> -0.0001^{*}$ | $<0.0001^{***}$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES | $-0.0244^{***}$ | $-0.0155^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0013)$ | $(0.0007)$ |
| RADICAL RIVAL | $0.1179^{***}$ | $0.0317^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0208)$ | $(0.0107)$ |
| CONSTANT | $1.2896^{***}$ | $1.1478^{***}$ |
| | $(0.1114)$ | $(0.0632)$ |
| var(YEAR) | $0.0787^{***}$ | $0.0255^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0336)$ | $(0.0108)$ |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC) | $0.0001^{***}$ | $0.0001^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0001)$ | $(0.0001)$ |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC$^2$) | $<0.0001^{***}$ | $<0.0001^{***}$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| var(L-R COMP) | $<0.0001^{***}$ | $<0.0001$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC$\times$ L-R COMP) | $<0.0001^{***}$ | $<0.0001^{***}$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| var(WITHIN-BLOC$^2\times$ L-R COMP) | $<0.0001^{***}$ | $<0.0001^{***}$ |
| | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |
| var(CONSTANT) | $0.0654^{***}$ | $0.0228^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0294)$ | $(0.0097)$ |
| var(RESIDUAL) | $0.1471^{***}$ | $0.0436^{***}$ |
| | $(0.0035)$ | $(0.0010)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 3683 | 3876 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

**FIGURE C.12:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITION
—TABLE C.10, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—




**FIGURE C.13:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION
—TABLE C.10, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—



# D Individual Year and Party Results

The main analysis presented in the paper pools the data across different elections while allowing for random coefficients (constant and slope). Pooling the data in this manner obscures differences across elections or parties that may be of interest. On the other hand, estimating our models per party and election means that the number of observations for each model can, and usually is, very small. Pooling the data provides greater statistical power and allows for a more concise presentation while sacrificing some of the nuance that focusing on individual parties and years provides. For those interested, tables D.11-D.22 present the results for models for each election and party, provided that the party advanced onto the second ballot in at least 30 constituencies. Moreover, we exclude contests where the number of available bloc votes — votes cast for other parties within the same bloc in the first round of the election — was less than 500. The dependent variable is the estimated share of available bloc votes won by the party, i.e., the increase in the party's vote as a share of the available bloc votes. An increase in a party's vote share on the second ballot is a result of supporters of other party's within the same bloc transferring their votes to the party that advances onto the second ballot but there are other sources of variation, such as, changes in turnout. When there are very few available bloc votes, those other sources will dominate and can result in extreme values of the dependent variable that have little to do with theoretical argument being examined.

As we do not have specific expectation about how vote transfers have changed over time or vary across party, we offer little in terms of discussion of the results. As readers may note, the estimated coefficients for OTHER VOTE appear quite large in some of the models, it is worth pointing out that substantive effect is not that large. The share of OTHER VOTE is generally very small and the vote shares are coded as fractions. Thus, considering the RPR in 1973 in table D.14, the other vote ranges from 0 to .05, which implies that moving from the minimum to the maximum vote share of other parties corresponds to a two percentage point decline in the share of the estimated available vote won by the RPR on the second ballot.

**TABLE D.11:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1958 ELECTION

| | (1) COM | (2) UNR | (3) CNI |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | 0.002 | −0.019 | 0.002 |
| | (0.003) | (0.040) | (0.135) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | −0.019*** | −0.118*** | −0.092 |
| | (0.006) | (0.041) | (0.112) |
| L-R COMP. × WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | −0.000* | −0.003 | −0.002 |
| | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.006) |
| OTHER VOTE | −0.927 | −7.934 | −8.796 |
| | (0.853) | (6.766) | (19.732) |
| MRP | 0.078 | | |
| | (0.080) | | |
| UNR | −0.025 | | |
| | (0.061) | | |
| RADSOC | | −0.977 | −1.805 |
| | | (1.021) | (1.734) |
| SFIO | | −0.663 | −0.940 |
| | | (0.523) | (1.516) |
| UDSRMIN | | −0.503 | |
| | | (2.623) | |
| UFD | | 0.024 | |
| | | (2.607) | |
| RADUFD | | | −1.034 |
| | | | (2.967) |
| CONSTANT | 0.230** | 1.185 | 1.841 |
| | (0.091) | (0.929) | (2.929) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 90 | 118 | 44 |
| $R^2$ | 0.22 | 0.20 | 0.12 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

**TABLE D.12:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1962 ELECTION

| | (1) COM | (2) UNR-UDT |
|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $-0.007$ | $-0.022^{*}$ |
| | $(0.006)$ | $(0.012)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.016^{**}$ | $-0.054^{***}$ |
| | $(0.008)$ | $(0.011)$ |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $0.000$ | $-0.001^{***}$ |
| | $(0.000)$ | $(0.001)$ |
| OTHER VOTE | $-2.933^{**}$ | $-2.477$ |
| | $(1.482)$ | $(2.913)$ |
| INDVREP | $0.284$ | |
| | $(0.352)$ | |
| MRP | $0.099$ | |
| | $(0.326)$ | |
| MRPVREP | $0.717$ | |
| | $(0.510)$ | |
| UNR-UDT | $-0.091$ | |
| | $(0.233)$ | |
| PSU | | $0.143$ |
| | | $(0.546)$ |
| RADSOC | | $-0.130$ |
| | | $(0.214)$ |
| SFIO | | $-0.185$ |
| | | $(0.143)$ |
| CONSTANT | $0.724^{***}$ | $0.414$ |
| | $(0.247)$ | $(0.283)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 147 | 142 |
| $R^2$ | 0.17 | 0.25 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**TABLE D.13:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1967 ELECTION

| | (1) COM | (2) FGDS | (3) UD5 |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $-0.001$ | $0.014^{***}$ | $-0.071$ |
| | $(0.004)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.062)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.016^{***}$ | $-0.003$ | $-0.109^{***}$ |
| | $(0.005)$ | $(0.007)$ | $(0.038)$ |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.001^{**}$ | $0.000$ | $-0.001$ |
| | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| OTHER VOTE | $-1.902^{*}$ | $-3.378$ | $-29.091$ |
| | $(1.065)$ | $(2.515)$ | $(23.660)$ |
| RI | $0.089$ | $0.159$ | |
| | $(0.183)$ | $(0.285)$ | |
| UD5 | $0.066$ | $0.168$ | |
| | $(0.170)$ | $(0.277)$ | |
| FGDS | | | $-0.409$ |
| | | | $(0.436)$ |
| PSU | | | $-1.684$ |
| | | | $(1.888)$ |
| CONSTANT | $0.771^{***}$ | $1.276^{***}$ | $-0.790$ |
| | $(0.178)$ | $(0.292)$ | $(1.182)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 155 | 166 | 85 |
| $R^2$ | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.25 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

**TABLE D.14:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1973 ELECTION

| | (1) COM | (2) SOC | (3) UDR-URP |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $0.007^{***}$ | $0.008^{***}$ | $-0.021$ |
| | $(0.001)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.038)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.010^{***}$ | $-0.006$ | $-0.093^{***}$ |
| | $(0.002)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.026)$ |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.000^{***}$ | $-0.000$ | $-0.000$ |
| | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| OTHER VOTE | $-1.084^{**}$ | $-2.348^{**}$ | $-51.923^{***}$ |
| | $(0.434)$ | $(0.944)$ | $(9.990)$ |
| DVD | $-0.095$ | $-0.198$ | |
| | $(0.125)$ | $(0.226)$ | |
| RI | $0.102$ | $-0.628^{***}$ | |
| | $(0.154)$ | $(0.223)$ | |
| RI-URP | $0.015$ | $-0.323^{**}$ | |
| | $(0.112)$ | $(0.149)$ | |
| UDR-URP | $0.095$ | $-0.300^{**}$ | |
| | $(0.110)$ | $(0.144)$ | |
| URP | $0.036$ | $-0.361^{**}$ | |
| | $(0.123)$ | $(0.168)$ | |
| DVG | | | $-1.166$ |
| | | | $(2.230)$ |
| MRG | | | $-1.356$ |
| | | | $(1.029)$ |
| PSU | | | $1.158$ |
| | | | $(2.233)$ |
| SOC | | | $-1.057^{***}$ |
| | | | $(0.345)$ |
| CONSTANT | $0.904^{***}$ | $1.551^{***}$ | $1.671^{**}$ |
| | $(0.115)$ | $(0.150)$ | $(0.809)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 163 | 171 | 176 |
| $R^2$ | 0.55 | 0.21 | 0.29 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**TABLE D.15:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1978 ELECTION

| | (1) COM | (2) SOC-MRG | (3) RPR | (4) UDF |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $0.008^{***}$ | $-0.002$ | $-0.019^{**}$ | $-0.014^{**}$ |
| | $(0.001)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.007)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $0.003$ | $-0.000$ | $-0.052^{***}$ | $-0.035^{***}$ |
| | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.005)$ |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $0.000$ | $-0.000^{**}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ |
| | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ |
| OTHER VOTE | $-1.655^{***}$ | $-4.190^{***}$ | $-6.297^{***}$ | $-3.745^{**}$ |
| | $(0.322)$ | $(0.393)$ | $(2.281)$ | $(1.870)$ |
| RPR | $0.027$ | $-0.032$ | | |
| | $(0.047)$ | $(0.041)$ | | |
| UDF | $0.003$ | $0.002$ | | |
| | $(0.048)$ | $(0.042)$ | | |
| SOC-MRG | | | $-0.498^{***}$ | $-0.236^{**}$ |
| | | | $(0.106)$ | $(0.091)$ |
| CONSTANT | $1.005^{***}$ | $1.230^{***}$ | $1.040^{***}$ | $1.101^{***}$ |
| | $(0.053)$ | $(0.050)$ | $(0.193)$ | $(0.138)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 142 | 261 | 199 | 164 |
| $R^2$ | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.37 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

**TABLE D.16:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1981 ELECTION

| | (1) SOC | (2) RPR | (3) UDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | 0.004 | 0.042 | −0.018 |
| | (0.002) | (0.036) | (0.024) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | −0.016*** | −0.033 | −0.073*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.021) | (0.016) |
| L-R COMP. × WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | −0.000** | 0.004** | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| OTHER VOTE | −5.649*** | −30.221 | −59.252** |
| | (1.115) | (31.155) | (26.350) |
| RPR | 0.014 | | |
| | (0.136) | | |
| RPR-UDF | −0.048 | | |
| | (0.163) | | |
| UDF | 0.018 | | |
| | (0.137) | | |
| DVG | | −1.238 | |
| | | (1.758) | |
| MRG | | −3.278** | −0.728 |
| | | (1.286) | (0.661) |
| SOC | | −1.640*** | −0.138 |
| | | (0.621) | (0.446) |
| CONSTANT | 1.101*** | 2.383** | 0.300 |
| | (0.147) | (0.976) | (0.772) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 261 | 89 | 80 |
| $R^2$ | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.56 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

**TABLE D.17:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1988 ELECTION

| | (1) SOC | (2) RPR | (3) UDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $-0.019^{*}$ | $-0.011^{*}$ | $-0.030^{***}$ |
| | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.011) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.035^{***}$ | $-0.018^{***}$ | $-0.035^{***}$ |
| | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.000$ | $-0.001^{**}$ | $-0.002^{***}$ |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| OTHER VOTE | $-8.049^{**}$ | $-3.604^{***}$ | $-3.654^{**}$ |
| | (3.349) | (1.106) | (1.706) |
| FN | 0.433 | | |
| | (0.276) | | |
| RPR | $-0.074$ | | |
| | (0.162) | | |
| UDF | $-0.028$ | | |
| | (0.164) | | |
| DVG | | $-0.038$ | $-0.306$ |
| | | (0.147) | (0.267) |
| MRG | | $0.383^{**}$ | 0.328 |
| | | (0.172) | (0.283) |
| SOC | | $-0.037$ | $-0.348$ |
| | | (0.112) | (0.231) |
| CONSTANT | $0.747^{***}$ | $0.906^{***}$ | $0.878^{***}$ |
| | (0.231) | (0.162) | (0.280) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 373 | 206 | 180 |
| $R^2$ | 0.20 | 0.29 | 0.40 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**TABLE D.18:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1993 ELECTION

| | (1) SOC | (2) RPR | (3) UDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $0.005^{*}$ | $-0.008$ | $-0.007$ |
| | $(0.003)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.007)$ |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.006^{**}$ | $-0.021^{***}$ | $-0.025^{***}$ |
| | $(0.003)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.005)$ |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $0.001^{***}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ |
| | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ |
| OTHER VOTE | $-5.502^{***}$ | $-2.005^{**}$ | $-1.031$ |
| | $(0.753)$ | $(0.915)$ | $(1.189)$ |
| FN | $0.389^{**}$ | | |
| | $(0.168)$ | | |
| RPR | $0.047$ | | |
| | $(0.053)$ | | |
| UDF | $-0.012$ | | |
| | $(0.054)$ | | |
| DVG | | $-0.056$ | $-0.317^{**}$ |
| | | $(0.117)$ | $(0.139)$ |
| MRG | | $0.014$ | $0.010$ |
| | | $(0.161)$ | $(0.158)$ |
| SOC | | $0.024$ | $-0.193^{**}$ |
| | | $(0.078)$ | $(0.083)$ |
| GENECO | | | $-0.549$ |
| | | | $(0.336)$ |
| VER | | | $-0.276$ |
| | | | $(0.312)$ |
| CONSTANT | $1.311^{***}$ | $0.892^{***}$ | $1.024^{***}$ |
| | $(0.088)$ | $(0.121)$ | $(0.126)$ |
| OBSERVATIONS | 278 | 169 | 139 |
| $R^2$ | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.40 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**TABLE D.19:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 1997 ELECTION

| | (1) PS-PRS | (2) RPR | (3) UDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $-0.030^{***}$ | $-0.005$ | $-0.011^{***}$ |
| | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.027^{***}$ | $-0.021^{***}$ | $-0.020^{***}$ |
| | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.001^{***}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| OTHER VOTE | $-10.014^{***}$ | $-1.261^{**}$ | $-1.670^{***}$ |
| | (0.933) | (0.570) | (0.546) |
| DVD | $-0.075$ | | |
| | (0.304) | | |
| FN | 0.250 | | |
| | (0.175) | | |
| LDI | 0.056 | | |
| | (0.408) | | |
| RPR | 0.107 | | |
| | (0.126) | | |
| RPRD | $-0.179$ | | |
| | (0.409) | | |
| UDF | 0.048 | | |
| | (0.126) | | |
| MDC | | $-0.302^{***}$ | 0.016 |
| | | (0.105) | (0.091) |
| PS-PRS | | $-0.295^{***}$ | 0.049 |
| | | (0.067) | (0.061) |
| VER | | $-0.334^{***}$ | $-0.082$ |
| | | (0.117) | (0.089) |
| CONSTANT | $1.287^{***}$ | $1.084^{***}$ | $0.768^{***}$ |
| | (0.172) | (0.085) | (0.078) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 430 | 204 | 174 |
| $R^2$ | 0.31 | 0.42 | 0.41 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**TABLE D.20:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 2002 ELECTION

| | (1) SOC | (2) UMP |
|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | 0.009 | 0.001 |
| | (0.007) | (0.002) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | −0.002 | −0.003** |
| | (0.006) | (0.001) |
| L-R COMP. × WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | 0.001** | −0.000*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| OTHER VOTE | −16.543*** | 0.728*** |
| | (1.490) | (0.276) |
| FN | 0.147 | |
| | (0.199) | |
| RPFIE | 0.621 | |
| | (0.407) | |
| UDF | −0.059 | |
| | (0.135) | |
| UMP | −0.054 | |
| | (0.115) | |
| DVG | | −0.035 |
| | | (0.056) |
| POREP | | 0.239 |
| | | (0.155) |
| PRG | | −0.021 |
| | | (0.045) |
| SOC | | −0.021 |
| | | (0.031) |
| VER | | −0.073* |
| | | (0.040) |
| CONSTANT | 1.797*** | 0.686*** |
| | (0.227) | (0.044) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 362 | 405 |
| $R^2$ | 0.40 | 0.29 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

**TABLE D.21:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 2007 ELECTION

| | (1) SOC | (2) UMP |
|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | $-0.020^{***}$ | $-0.016^{**}$ |
| | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.019^{***}$ | $-0.018^{***}$ |
| | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.000^{**}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| OTHER VOTE | $-14.465^{***}$ | $-1.716$ |
| | (1.511) | (1.189) |
| FN | 0.242 | |
| | (0.443) | |
| UDFDEM | $-0.343$ | |
| | (0.440) | |
| UMP | 0.220 | |
| | (0.312) | |
| DVG | | 0.106 |
| | | (0.147) |
| PRG | | $0.532^{***}$ |
| | | (0.139) |
| SOC | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.095) |
| VER | | $-0.300$ |
| | | (0.226) |
| CONSTANT | $1.402^{***}$ | $0.324^{*}$ |
| | (0.345) | (0.189) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 357 | 407 |
| $R^2$ | 0.38 | 0.20 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$

**TABLE D.22:** COMPETITION & COHESION IN THE 2012 ELECTION

| | (1) VEC | (2) SOC | (3) UMP |
|---|---|---|---|
| L-R COMP. | 0.002 | $-0.037^{***}$ | $-0.012^{***}$ |
| | (0.018) | (0.007) | (0.003) |
| WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.004$ | $-0.021^{***}$ | $-0.014^{***}$ |
| | (0.013) | (0.005) | (0.003) |
| L-R COMP. $\times$ WITHIN-BLOC COMP. | $-0.000$ | $-0.001^{***}$ | $-0.001^{***}$ |
| | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| OTHER VOTE | $-7.180^{*}$ | $-12.950^{***}$ | $-1.281^{*}$ |
| | (3.935) | (1.191) | (0.683) |
| FN | | 0.039 | |
| | | (0.148) | |
| UMP | | 0.135 | |
| | | (0.126) | |
| FG | | | $-0.172$ |
| | | | (0.186) |
| PRG | | | $-0.180^{*}$ |
| | | | (0.093) |
| SOC | | | $-0.224^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.078) |
| VEC | | | $-0.160^{*}$ |
| | | | (0.088) |
| CONSTANT | $1.389^{***}$ | $0.883^{***}$ | $0.881^{***}$ |
| | (0.398) | (0.195) | (0.099) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 35 | 339 | 364 |
| $R^2$ | 0.28 | 0.37 | 0.15 |

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ p $< 0.10$, $^{**}$ p $< 0.05$, $^{***}$ p $< 0.01$